Irena Martínková

# Instrumentality and values in sport

KAROLINUM

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**PhDr. Irena Martínková, Ph.D.**

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Reviewed by:
prof. Sigmund Loland, Ph.D.
prof. PhDr. Ivo Jirásek, Ph.D.

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# I. Introduction

## 1. Introduction

Whilst I was writing this book, I watched the 2011–12 UEFA final between Bayern Munich and Chelsea. During the whole game Bayern was more offensive, having more chances to score, and was superior on the overall match statistics. The score of the prolonged game was 1–1. It went to penalties, and Chelsea won 3–4. It might be said that Chelsea achieved superiority in the match only with its final kick. After the game, one of the Czech television commentators remarked on the final score: "But history doesn't ask *how*, but *if*." For a historical comparison of the victories of different clubs, what counts is only: *if* they won. However, this book is written within the discipline of philosophy of sport, and my pervading focus will be on *how* sport is practised.

Since sport is an activity created by and engaged in by human beings, it cannot be understood without reference to the character of human existence and its meaningful realization. Sport is practised by millions of people worldwide nowadays, and they often use it instrumentally to fulfil their various purposes. Through the influence of the expectations of wider society, we tend to emphasize these purposes (ends) over the means with which we gain them, and sport is no exception in this respect. This approach is mirrored in our sayings "The end justifies the means" and "If end is good, all is good". Generally, in present times, sport results have become more important than other aspects of sport performance, and the overemphasizing of results heavily influences the way in which sports are practiced. The tendency to emphasize results, rather than the means and processes that produce them, leads us to overvalue victory and the other values that victory brings, and to side-line those values that we usually associate with 'process', such as, for example, fair play, aesthetic

experience, joy, friendship and quality of movement – or, in summary, the quality of the process of sport performance.

This kind of thinking, that values the result of an activity rather than the process itself, may be called instrumental thinking. Instrumental thinking originates in the most basic fact of our existence: that we humans need to sustain ourselves on a daily basis, and if we wish to be (to exist), we need to take care of ourselves and to fulfil our everyday needs, for which we need to use various means. However, the importance of instrumental thinking in supporting our very existence leads us to extend this mode of thinking to many other aspects of our existence, too. We have a tendency to think about many different things in this way, even about people. Yet the instrumental approach is not appropriate for just anything and everything.

In ethical theory, instrumentality is usually considered to be negative, and is often understood as someone abusing someone or something. One is reminded of Kant's injunction to treat other people (and also oneself) never merely as a means to an end: "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only" (Kant, 1975, 47).

In sport, instrumentality is also often associated with some negative aspects, the two main objections being:

1. Problems arising when sport is used as a means for pursuing values external to it – such as fame and finance – which bring a greedy and selfish attitude, and one that is likely to lead to cheating and corruption, and to distort the process of sport.
2. Problems arising when sport competition is understood as negative, as setting one human against another, as using another to demonstrate one's superiority.

As to the first objection, it is important to emphasize that in practice we do not see all cases of instrumentality in sport in negative terms, since we esteem highly some values external to sport, and we find it desirable to pursue them. For example, we do not usually think it problematic if sport is practised as a means for moral education or health. So to think only negatively about the instrumental pursuit of external aims fails to notice that we do so only when we negatively perceive the value pursued.

As to the second objection, it may be true that a problematic consequence of competition is that we put too much emphasis on attaining victory, and that this might adversely affect other values of sport. But competition might have positive effects, too. For example, competition

might be considered a valuable motivation for participation in sport – as did Pierre de Coubertin in his effort to install sports into education as well as into the general life of citizens at the end of 19th century through his 'brain-child', Olympism. Also, the twofold challenge of testing one's skills together with testing oneself against an opponent enables competition to be regarded as a reliable way of improving one's level of performance and level of vigorous activity. Two athletes racing stride for stride, breathing down each other's necks, may be able to push themselves (and each other) to a much higher level of performance than just one person practicing alone. So whether competition is to be seen as good or bad depends on how we approach it, and what outcomes we expect of it.

However, it is important to realize that instrumentality in sport is not just the result of external valuation and competition. It is also implicit in the structure of many sports, an integral part of which is an objective to be achieved. The rules of all sports specify what is to count as the objective to be sought in the sport, and what means are permissible. So, the achievement of any such objective presupposes instrumentality – I must take certain prescribed means (and avoid means proscribed by the rules).

Thus, at least two factors contribute to the necessary presence of instrumentality in sport: the competitive element in sport, and sport-specific objectives. And their effects are often amplified when extrinsic values are involved. Now, it is clear that it is not possible to remove instrumentality from sport. Thus, on the one hand, instrumentality is unavoidable in sport and, on the other hand, it is likely to damage sport in a variety of ways – especially when it overrides the intrinsic values of sport. So it is of the first importance to understand the nature of instrumentality in sport, since this will help in devising a more adequate approach to the problems it causes, and to their prevention. Thus I shall argue that instrumentality does not have to be considered as negative aspect of sport, if properly understood and treated.

The aim of this book is to analyse contemporary sport with respect to instrumentality and its influence on intrinsic values of sport and the human being. By sport, I mean a competitive sport performed on different levels, which includes elite sport, performance sport, sport for all, youth sport, and sport within Physical Education (to be explained in more depth later). I shall discuss the tension between the necessarily instrumental nature of sport and various problems it causes for sporting performance and the human existence. And I shall suggest possible ways of coming to terms with and dealing with instrumentality in sport.

The main topics that will be addressed within this book are:

- the definition of instrumentality, sport and values,
- the role of instrumentality in human existence,
- extrinsic and intrinsic instrumentality in sport, and problems with both of them,
- the extrinsic and intrinsic values of sport, and
- various ways of balancing the instrumentality in sport.

## 2. The structure of the book

This book unites and develops further my previous work concerning the topic of instrumentality in sport and the related topic of values in sport and human existence. The book has four sections. After an introductory section, the core of the book consists of two main parts: the first part (section II) discusses the idea of instrumentality with respect to values in sport, while the second part (section III) examines in what ways it is possible to 'balance' instrumentality in sport, and thus to highlight sport's intrinsic values. The fourth section is a conclusion which unites the central topics of the book – instrumentality, sport and human existence.

**The first section** introduces the main objective of the book, the structure of the book and the methodology. These first three chapters are followed by a chapter on the definitions of the central concepts of this book, i.e. sport, instrumentality in sport, and values in sport. Finally, I will present an analysis of some themes in the early work of Martin Heidegger, in order to give a wider understanding of the role of instrumentality within the existence of the human being.

**The second section** of the book introduces the logic of sport with respect to instrumentality. Chapter 6 presents complex analyses of instrumentality within sport and an identification of two kinds of instrumentality – extrinsic and intrinsic. Further, it identifies five elements of instrumentality in sport. These two kinds of instrumentality are examined in detail in chapter 7: 'Sport and its extrinsic instrumentality and values', and chapter 9: 'Sport and its intrinsic instrumentality'. The former chapter discusses extrinsic values that are often attributed to sport, and the latter shows the complicated structure of the instrumentality of internal ends in sport, which is formed out of the objectives of the given sport, together with the aim of competition, i.e. victory. The chapter on

intrinsic instrumentality is followed by a chapter 'The intrinsic values of sport' (chapter 10). This section also includes two chapters (8 and 11) that describe and reflect upon the problems arising for the human being from each of the two kinds of instrumentality in sport.

**The third section** of the book deals with the 'balancing' of instrumentality in sport with respect to education. Balancing is defined as putting appropriate emphasis on all the five elements of instrumentality in sport that I have identified in the second half of chapter 6. The relationship between instrumentality and education is considered in chapter 12, called 'Education, sport and the balancing of instrumentality'. The rest of the section deals with conclusions arising from the discussions in the second section of the book – since instrumentality causes various problems in sport, it is important to balance it, so that these problems decrease or even disappear. For this reason, seven different approaches towards balancing the instrumentality in sport are introduced (chapters 13–19).

The first two chapters in this section deal with extrinsic instrumentality, which is the only kind of instrumentality that can be fully eliminated from competitive sport. Chapter 13, 'Decreasing the 'constraining' extrinsic values of sport', describes two ways of decreasing (or even eliminating) extrinsic instrumentality of sport – one focuses on the individual athlete and his or her questioning of the extrinsic values followed through sport, while the second one presents an effort to regulate sport from the top-down approach, such was done, for example, in the case of amateurism within Olympism. And chapter 14 'Promoting the 'enhancing' extrinsic values of sport' discusses educational efforts within sport that try to improve sport through extrinsic values that support intrinsic values of sport, often giving them a wider human dimension. An example of these efforts is Olympic education.

All the remaining chapters of this section focus on balancing intrinsic instrumentality in sport. Chapter 15, 'Keeping the intrinsic values of sport in perspective' presents examples of balancing the intrinsic values that have been defined earlier, highlighting the importance of keeping all of these values in sport practice. Chapter 16, 'Understanding the athlete and the nature of sport', describes how our deeper understanding of the human being and sport can help diminish the problematic effects of instrumentality in sport. Chapter 17, 'Re-designing sport disciplines', shows a creative approach to sport that is based on rethinking the logic of sport so that its intrinsic instrumentality is balanced within practice. Chapter 18, 'Focusing on the process', draws the athlete's attention to the quality of the processes involved in athletic performance, which helps to

diminish the athlete's focus on victory and results. Chapter 19, the final chapter of this section called 'Adding non-instrumental activities into sport training', describes what it means for a movement activity to be non-instrumental, on the basis of descriptions of practices from the Far East. This chapter is based on my previous work on Zen Buddhism and its connection with martial paths. It suggests the possibility of including this kind of non-instrumental activity into athletic training, so that athletes learn to pay better attention to the quality of the process of their sport performance.

**The concluding section** includes one summarizing chapter called 'Choosing the fair or the temple'. It discusses all the main themes of the book and puts the topic of instrumentality into context of the overall direction of the athlete's existence. The name of the chapter comes from Pierre de Coubertin, the reviver of the Modern Olympic Games, and President of the International Olympic Committee (1896–1925), who described two possible directions of athletic development, naming them metaphorically 'the fair' and 'the temple'. The notion of 'fair' (or 'market') is characterised by a human being's following the prevailing patterns and ends prescribed by society, without much reflection upon them, nor on his or her own existence, putting the emphasis on an instrumental approach to things. Within sport, this is represented by wanting to win at all costs, lack of respect, self-promotion, and doing sport for extrinsic values. The notion of 'temple' is based on a certain clarity about one's existence and striving – one's doing and thinking – and about understanding of what sport is about. Within the context of sport this is instantiated as a kind of self-development based on self-understanding and critical reflection, which incorporates an understanding of instrumentality and an ability to approach it and to engage with it in appropriate ways, so that intrinsic values of sport can thrive.

## 3. Methodology

The aim of this book is to examine the idea of instrumentality and its influence on values in contemporary competitive sport, with special reference to the athlete. I shall discuss instrumentality as found in the logic of contemporary competitive sport and, to show the importance of this topic, I shall also discuss aspects of the philosophy of existence that highlights the tendency of human beings to be instrumental. I shall use two methods for achieving this end.

Firstly, I shall introduce the logic of contemporary sport with respect to its instrumentality. I shall analyse instrumentality in sport using a method from analytical philosophy – that is, conceptual analysis. Here, I shall draw mainly on the previous work of philosophers of sport who work within the analytical philosophical tradition, who have analysed the concept of sport, and ends and values in sport. However, there is not much written on the concept of instrumentality, which is the main contribution of this book to this tradition. Analyses of various ends that are realized in sport practice will help me to present the complex structure of instrumentality in sport. In addition, I shall also need to examine many values that routinely occur within sport practice – both extrinsic and intrinsic values.

Secondly, I shall use philosophy of existence in order to give a wider scope to the main theme of the book. I shall present an account of human existence that incorporates instrumentality within it, based on phenomenological analysis as described in the early work of Martin Heidegger, who discusses these issues in his work *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*).[1] Heidegger's work was chosen because of the acuity of his seminal analyses of human existence, and the power of his influential account of instrumental understanding within our everyday existence.

Heidegger's central question is one that we might see as the most fundamental question in philosophy: the meaning of Being (Heidegger, 1978, § 7). However, since this very question is one posed only by the human being, there is a logically prior question: what is the nature of the human being – the one who seeks to understand being? So, within his project of fundamental ontology (*Fundamentalontologie*), Heidegger examines the nature of human existence, and this analysis of the being of the human being (Dasein) shows that 'understanding' is one of its basic features of existence (one of its Existentiale).

Heidegger then proceeds to show that 'instrumental understanding' is the primary and necessary mode of understanding of Dasein (which is of obvious importance for the subject of this book). However, it is also important to realize that instrumentality is not the appropriate mode of understanding for the understanding of just anything at all – and especially not for an understanding of the human being, whose mode of

1 To enable easier orientation within different editions and translations of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, I refer to it by both the pagination of the original work *Sein und Zeit* (which is also printed on the side of the translated English text) and the pagination of the English translation itself (trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, 1978). The pages will be noted in the following order: original pagination/pagination of the English translation.

being is 'existence' (*Existenz*). It is in his analysis of the everyday world of Dasein (1978, § 14 ff.), and especially his analysis of 'things' in the world, whose mode of being is that of 'instruments', or 'tools', that Heidegger examines the idea of instrumentality, using the term 'readiness-to-hand' (*Zuhandenheit*). This will be explained in chapter 5.

I shall discuss various kinds of problems that arise from instrumentality for the human being. Within these discussions, the philosophy of existence will make its contribution, since these problems concern the quality of the process of sport as well as the quality of human existence itself.

Understanding both contemporary competitive sport and human existence with respect to instrumentality will help me to grasp the general problem and also to suggest various ways of balancing instrumentality in sport, so that the intrinsic values of sport can thrive and the human being can be enriched by sport. Both of these methods will be united in the concluding chapter 'Choosing the fair or the temple', in which I shall show how instrumentality in sport is related to human existence.

## 4. Defintions

### Defining sport

From amongst the vast range of areas of experience that are open to human beings, the subject and focus of this book is the area of experience generally described as 'contemporary sport'. However, this area itself is impossibly large, given the wide scope of its many and various definitions, some of which would include almost any kind of physical or movement activity. Since we can understand sport in so many different ways, it is important to offer some definition of how it is to be understood here. For the purpose of this book, sport is understood as:

> *Organised, rule-governed competition, in which abilities to accomplish a task associated with gross bodily movements are contested.*

Sport is more formal, serious, organised, and institutionalised than the games or other (usually pragmatic) activities from which different kinds of sport arose. Defined in this way, I shall refer to this kind of sport as 'competitive sport'. This definition tries to grasp sport as it is found in contemporary society.

Often, when we speak of competitive sport, we mean elite sport. However, this definition also embraces other levels of participation in competitive sport – organized sport for all, child and youth sport, school sport, etc. For the purpose of examining instrumentality in competitive sport, it is not important how far the athletes have reached in their efforts to improve their performance in relation to other participants, but that they are striving for it – striving to win whilst demonstrating the skills and accomplishing the mutually accepted tasks of the given sport.

For my purposes here, it is also useful to introduce the distinction between test and contest (as developed by Kretchmar, 1975; 2005b, 170 ff.), each of which points to a different aspect of the instrumentality in sport. It is possible to think of sport as a 'test'. This highlights those elements of sports in which there is a precise task to be fulfilled, which is characterized by agreed rules, and so in some sense an 'objective' task. Examples of such tasks would be: running the distance of 400 metres within a specified time; or returning the tennis ball over the net and into the opponent's court. These tasks are 'tests' because they are in some sense 'absolute' – they are pass/fail. This pass/fail aspect can be manifested in sophisticated ways: for example, each time a tennis player strikes a ball, he faces the above two tests: over/not over, and in/out. Each shot is either halted by the net, or not (it either goes over or not), and if it goes over, it falls either in or out. Imagine a net cord, where the ball hits the top cord of the net and flies up into the air perpendicularly. Now we must wait, as the ball comes down, to see which side it falls on. Maybe (*per impossibile*) the ball hits the net cord again and flies up a second time. Still, we must wait. But, eventually, it will fall 'absolutely' somewhere, and the test will be resolved.

Whilst thinking of sport as a 'test', then, sport practice includes striving and improving with respect to the given task. Tennis players, even without thinking about an opponent, or an opponent's possible abilities and strategies, practice returning ground strokes again and again, seeking to return the ball over the net and in the court. A 400 metres runner can set himself the practice test of running 47-second laps, and he can do this alone.

Contest, on the other hand, involves "… finding someone with whom one can share a test" (Kretchmar, 1975, 27). So a test is the basis of, and provides the opportunity for, a contest – and it is contest that introduces the element of mutual competition in sport. Competition results from the possibility that sport performances can be compared against something: an opponent or a team and, in a derivative sense of the word,

also against an established record or a personal best.[2] As a result of such comparison, competition produces winners and losers.

Competition can be regarded as both communal and enriching. As Kretchmar puts it: "The transition from test to contest is the change from human singularity to community" (1975, 27). But the transition from test to contest is also the change from absolute test to relative (comparative) contest, and this extra aspect of comparison with opponents represents an enrichment of the testing of our abilities that is an intrinsic value of sport, which intensifies the human enjoyment of tension, uncertainty and striving. These can be considered to be examples of sport-specific values.

Last, but not least, we need to include sport within the context of wider social values, which some authors consider may influence the very definition of sport.[3] These values are related to features of sport such as being organised and institutionalised. Even though these values may not be logically necessary for sport as such, they are important for its existence, since sport is always embedded in wider society. Indeed, the recent history of competitive sports shows such a high level and a wide scope of such embeddedness that, for many of us, sport has become an important part of our lives, and this is what makes sport contest so important and serious for us.

## Defining instrumentality in sport

Now, it is necessary to define the basic concepts of instrumentality. In most general terms, instrumentality means using something as a means for something else. Thus instrumentality has a means-and-ends structure:

*means* $\rightarrow^{4}$ *ends*

2 Record-sport carries the possibility of returning the contest to a kind of test. Records set a score, which challenges (or 'tests') the future performances of every other athlete who tries to beat it. Against this characterisation, it might be said that the test is set by the community of practice up to nowadays (such as all pole-vaulters), and so it remains a contest. However, this kind of 'competing with the past' carries a quite different sense of 'social' than that required for the social character of contests. (See also Kretchmar, 2005b, 162) Similarly, competition as a contest is something different than competition with the self (see self-competition in Hurych, 2009).

3 Steenbergen and Tamboer (2002, 38), with reference to Franke (1983), go so far as to deem these wider social values to be a part of the definition of sport.

4 Read as: 'lead(s) to'.

Ends do not necessarily mean ultimate ends, since they can (and often do) become means again:

*means → ends (= means) → ends ...*

The *means* are the various processes that might lead towards the ends. However, since instrumentality within sport admits of several different kinds of ends, it is necessary to define further some terms that will be helpful in distinguishing between them. The terms that are important for describing the logic of sport in terms of its instrumentality are: ends, objectives, results, aims, and values. Although these terms may have been employed in various ways according to context (such as in ethics, education, politics, etc.), the concepts that I shall use in this book are derived from the logic of sport itself, and its specific structure.

An *end* is seen as an umbrella term for all of the other terms listed below, meaning something that we pursue in the most general terms within sport. I usually use this term when I do not need to distinguish between objectives, aims and results; sometimes, though, I use it in a wider sense – meaning a general final point of one's efforts. This meaning can also be depicted by the word 'goal' (e.g. as in Loland, 1998).[5] Since these two terms are often thought of as synonyms, I shall avoid the use of 'goal' (in this sense, not in the sense of a goal that is scored in football, etc.) and use only the term 'end' in this book.[6]

*Objectives* are more concrete ends of accomplishing the given tasks within a given sporting activity that are specified by sport rules. Objectives are thus ends at the level of a particular sport test that seeks to fulfil a certain task. For example, an objective of football is to score a goal, i.e. to get the whole of the ball over the whole of the line between the posts and under the crossbar behind the goal line of the opponent.

The objectives of sport as such are not valuable for everyday life in society. For example, scoring a goal is a specific objective of football, handball or water polo, and an ability to score a goal is not valuable *per se* from the point of view of one's life in society. Nevertheless, scoring a goal is an integral part of these sports. It is true that some sports may contribute to human life outside of sport in different ways – for example, as a kind of by-product of the practice of sport. Thus, an activity may be seen as contributing to a general value for life within the society,

5 E.g. when comparing with Loland's works (1998, 94 f.; 2002), he uses the term 'goal' in places where I use the term 'end' in this book.

6 Unless the term 'goal' is in direct quotes (e.g. Loland, 2009; IOC, 2012).

such as, for example, improving one's overall mobility in everyday life due to participation in running disciplines (being able to run to catch a bus, being able to move easily and readily from one place to another). However, what is trained for and competed over in sport is a *particular* running distance, and thus it is the running of this particular distance that demands special attention.

Objectives provide the basis for scoring and for the final score that is the outcome of the competition, which I call the *result*. This may be simply an individual score, such as 1–0 in football, or a time of 1:25.68 in downhill skiing, but then these individual scores may be compared to each other, resulting in rankings (first, second, third, place, etc.), and they may also may be objectivised and understood as records.

An *aim* is the overall end of a particular activity. It is related to the competitive character of sport – the contest, in which opposing athletes or teams are compared against each other. Simply said, the aim of a sport is to win, in the particular manner and through the particular means of the particular sport (and this can be done in different ways in different sports, see, for example, Loland, 2002, 9). However, whilst there is always *one aim* of a particular sport – to win – we can say that sometimes this is also expressed as 'to outperform the opponent', 'to play as well as possible' whilst trying to do so, or at least 'not to lose' (e.g. in football this means to score *more* goals than the opposing team – or at least not to score less). Aims can be diversified in sport in the sense of different outcomes that sport brings (e.g. victory in a single race, victory in a league, victory in a tournament).

## Defining values of sport

Now, it is important to say what it means to be a value. *Values* are the most general goods that we as humans pursue in terms of our overall existence, and that justify our striving. They are goods that humans find desirable and worth committing themselves to. There are different kinds of values that characterize different areas of life and, to begin in a very basic way, Kretchmar identifies two classes of values – moral and nonmoral:

> "Moral values are certain personality traits and human motives. They describe what we often call a morally good person. These are traits like honesty, conscientiousness, affection, prudence, industriousness and courage. Nonmoral values are things that we desire from life. Rather than describing a person or a person's motives, they identify items that people

> want – things like pleasure, knowledge, wealth, security, excellence, and friendship." (Kretchmar, 1994, 111–112)

Although Kretchmar defines non-moral values in a negative way (those values that are *not* moral), we might also describe these values positively – as, for example, social (e.g. friendship), economic (e.g. wealth), cultural (e.g. knowledge), aesthetic (e.g. beauty), experiential (e.g. joy), existential (e.g. love) or political (e.g. peace). A single value can belong to different areas of human existence (e.g. excellence can be understood as a cultural as well as an existential value).

While values are the most general ends we commit ourselves to, not all values are ends in themselves. Some values are instrumental, leading to some other values (for example, wealth can enable new life experiences, such as in sky-diving), and some are non-instrumental, being ends in themselves (for example, joy can be of value in itself). And whether a value is employed instrumentally or not depends on the motivations, desires and attitudes of the particular human being.

In terms of the instrumentality in sport, it is also important to distinguish intrinsic and extrinsic values – 'values *of* sport' and 'values pursued *through* sport'. For example, a value *of* (or *in*) sport is movement mastery (an intrinsic value) and a value pursued *through* sport is health (an extrinsic value). These two kinds of value are not exclusive, since sport participants may give importance to both of them at the same time. However, pursuing only extrinsic values of sport may turn out to be damaging for sport participation.

In the context of values, I also speak of *ideals*, meaning 'super-values' or 'ultimate values'. Ideals often combine values together, in a set of values that indicates some overall model of the perfect human being and the direction for human development to follow. This complexity may make their interpretation somewhat difficult. Ideals are models of proposed perfection, and they differ from values in the degree of their attainability. Being an ideal does not mean that we may fully accomplish the ideal. Loland (2000, 48) explains this in the following way:

> "The fact that an ideal is not realised in practice, or the fact that an ideal is threatened and perhaps losing its influence, is of course no decisive argument against it."

Loland is trying to indicate the way in which ideals enter into the process of our living sports in practice: "Ideals … must be understood

as guiding norms" (ibid.). In this way, ideals are part of our existence as the ends towards which we aim. They structure our particular actions through our commitment to pursuing them.

As examples of ideals we may give the ancient Greek ideal of education, which is sometimes considered an ideal even within contemporary society, *aretē* (Hogenová, 2001), and the ideal that we associate with ancient Greek athletics, *kalokagathia* (Martínková, 2010), or Coubertin's idea of *eurhythmy* (2000d).

## 5. Human existence and instrumentality

While the main focus of this book is the logic of sport with respect to instrumentality and its impact on values in sport, I shall now show how instrumentality is embedded within human existence, as described in the early work of Martin Heidegger, especially his book *Being and Time*. Heidegger's work is suitable especially because it explains in detail how instrumentality is embedded in human existence. Whilst the central question of Heidegger's book concerns the meaning of Being, he sees as an essential pre-requisite the analysis of the mode of being of the human being, which he calls '*Dasein*'[7], i.e. existence (*Existenz*). Let me now introduce and explain the concept of Dasein.

Dasein is understood by Heidegger as one's own being – the being of me as a 'human being'. This mode of being is distinguished from other modes of being (the modes of being of other entities) as one whose very being is an issue for it. Only Dasein sees its own being as an issue for it. Other modes of being include the being of plants and animals (which he calls 'life', *Leben*), the mode of being of tools or equipment ('readiness-to-hand', *Zuhandenheit*), the mode of being of objects ('presence-at-hand', *Vorhandenheit*), and so on (Heidegger, 1978, 2001a). This kind of orientation on one's own being (as a being whose very being is an issue for it), is grasped in the structure of Care (*Sorge*), which is an essential structure of Dasein's being. Heidegger describes Care within the everyday existence of Dasein as 'concern' (*Besorgen*) (1978, 57/83) – a concern for one's own being.

What is Dasein's being like in everyday existence? Dasein's everyday being can be described as dwelling, being familiar with, being involved

7 The German word '*Dasein*' is sometimes translated into English as 'being-there', while sometimes it is kept in German. I shall keep the German word here.